Desencuentros escéptico-inductivos: ¿Disuelve la inducción material el problema de la inducción?
Resumen
Abstract. Sceptic-inductive disagreements: Does material induction dissolve the problem of induction?
To justify the inductive rules of inference—the problem of induction—leads to various answers, none of them problem-free according to the majority of philosophers. John Norton has proposed a dissolution of such difficulty. He claims that the problem arises since if we try to justify inductive rules of inference, we end with a rule circularity (something considered as vicious). It will be argued that Norton’s approach ends with a new type of circularity, one inside the web of facts of mature science. How then is this new circularity epistemically better than rule circularity? We posit that Norton does not offer an adequate answer.
Key words: Justification of induction, material induction, J. Norton, circularity, regress, stipulation, Agripa, coherence.
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