From natural history to history: the scope and limits of evolutionary epistemology and teleosemantics as naturalist research programs

Andrés Luis Jaume

Resumen


This paper examines the feasibility of evolutionary epistemology and telesosemantics as naturalistic accounts of knowledge and intentionality. Both constitute a good example of what is called Philosophical Naturalism. After considering queries in both theories, we propose a different account in order to naturalize knowledge and meaning. The argumentative line defended is another kind of naturalization, one based on history and not only in natural history. From this point of view, concept fixation and epistemological justification practices are dependent on historical dynamics, not on natural history by itself.

Key words. Evolutionary epistemology, epistemological justification, history, natural history, Philosophical Naturalism, teleosemantics.


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Referencias


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