Sobre el concepto popular de acción intencional: Una revisión a los acercamientos experimentales

David Fajardo-Chica, Sergio Monares, Gimena Villegas, Andrés Zules

Resumen


An the folk concept of intentional action: a review of the experimental approaches

We review here some efforts made by social psychology and experimental philosophy to elucidate how does the concept of intentionality apply when collateral effects occur. We attend to some of the tests made and the hypotheses offered, as well as an overview of the discussions involved.

 

Key words: Intentionality, experimental philosophy, common sense, popular psychology.

 


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Referencias


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