El popperiano como un pirrónico: la noción de justificación epistémica en Karl Popper

Resumen

Popperism as pyrrhonin attitude: epistemic justification in Karl Popper

Popper argues in the <i>Logic of Scientific Discovery</i> (published in 1934 in German) against both an externalist and an internalist epistemic justification for observational statements; Popper then opts in the LSD for a position that substitutes the justification of the basic statements of science with their criticism; and he stops a regress of criticisms with some conventional decisions. Later, in the Open Society (1945) he argues for a critical rationalism, one that requires some argumentatively unjustified and unjustifiable presuppositions, i.e., it requires some dogmas. The late Popper (circa 1983), seems inclined towards a pancritical rationalism, a position that leads, however, to a logical paradox, which can only be evaded if some presuppositions are to be accepted as not criticizable. Thus, the Popperian requires either some unjustifiable or some uncriticizable presuppositions. These dogmatic presuppositions should be believed passively and judgment about their truth value should be suspended. This is the Popperian’s Pyrrhonian attitude.

Key words: Critical rationalism, acritical rationalism, pancritical rationalism, Pyrrhonism, K. Popper, dogmatism, uncritizable, justification.