Flexibilidad cognitiva e inferencia

Mariela Aguilera

Resumen


Cognitive flexibility and inference

Some philosophers, such as Davidson and McDowell, claim that rationality involves a contrast between the subjective and the objective, between mind and world. For these authors, such contrast merges into reflective thought, through linguistic competence. Millikan, instead, has argued that rationality can be placed within non linguistic creatures, which exhibit a first contrast between mind and world by means of behavioral flexibility, as a result of cognitive integration and affordances. In this paper, I will identify what I call “cognitive flexibility”—a middle ground between reflective thought and behavioral flexibility. Cognitive flexibility paves the route to another sort of process-rationality, which results from reasoning and inference. Moreover, I argue that certain kinds of primates are rational in this way through instrumental reasoning.

 

Key words: Millikan, rationality, language, second order thought, animal cognition, cognitive integration, stimulus independence, behavioral flexibility, affordances, instrumental reasoning, reasoning.

 


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Referencias


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